Tax structure and welfare in a model of optimal fiscal policy by Jan-Ting Guo & Kevin J. Lansing
11
Tax Structure and Welfare
in a Model of Optimal 
Fiscal Policy
by Jang-Ting Guo and Kevin J. Lansing Jang-Ting Guo is an assistant pro-
fessor of economics at the University
of California, Riverside, and Kevin J.
Lansing is an economist at the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland and a
visiting scholar at the Hoover Institu-
tion. For helpful comments and sug-
gestions, the authors thank Charles
Carlstrom, Gary Hansen, Peter
Rupert, Benjamin Russo, seminar
participants at the 1994 Society for
Economic Dynamics and Control
conference and the 1995 Western
Economic Association meetings, and
an anonymous referee. 
Introduction
Every year, Congress passes a bill that tinkers in
some way with our tax system. During the
1980s, however, two major tax bills were
enacted that fundamentally altered the structure
of the federal income tax: the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81) and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). Although many
changes to the tax code have been made since
then, a number of important structural features
of the current U.S. tax system can be traced to
these two laws.
ERTA81 imposed a dramatic 23 percent,
across-the-board cut in all marginal tax rates,
and reduced the top marginal rate for individual
income from 70 to 50 percent. Statutory mar-
ginal rates were scaled back to levels approxi-
mating those that prevailed in 1965. To help
eliminate “bracket creep,” tax brackets, personal
exemptions, and the standard personal deduc-
tion were all indexed to inflation. Another im-
portant feature of ERTA81 was the introduction
of new incentives for investment and saving.
For the purposes of this paper, the most note-
worthy of these was the introduction of gener-
ous accelerated depreciation schedules.1
TRA86 brought about the most significant
overhaul of the federal tax system since its
inception in 1913. It lowered marginal rates for
individuals and corporations, dramatically re-
duced the number of income brackets, broad-
ened the tax base by eliminating or reducing
many tax breaks, and substantially lowered the
dispersion of marginal rates across alternative
income-producing activities. These changes
were viewed as a significant step toward achiev-
ing a simpler, more efficient system. Another
important element of the legislation was that
average marginal tax rates on labor and capital
income were brought closer together. The data
in table 1, taken from the 1987 Economic Report
of the President, illustrate this point.
TRA86 also reduced the dispersion of mar-
ginal tax rates within each category of income.
For labor income, the number of individual tax
brackets was reduced to only two: 15 percent
and 28 percent. Before TRA86, there were 14
n 1 1 Other incentives included an increase in the investment tax credit
and an extension of the eligibility rules for Individual Retirement Accounts.
The generous depreciation schedules were partially scaled back by the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. For more details, see Eco-
nomic Report of the President,1987 and 1989.
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tax brackets, ranging from 11 to 50 percent.2 
In the category of capital income, the legisla-
tion eliminated the investment tax credit (which,
under ERTA81, had applied to equipment but
not structures), wiped out the capital gains
preference by taxing gains as ordinary income,
decelerated the depreciation schedule for real
estate, imposed limits on passive business and
real estate losses, and phased out the deducti-
bility of non-mortgage consumer interest. By
imposing a more uniform tax on alternative
sources of income, TRA86 was designed to
eliminate incentives in the tax code that had
directed resources to less productive activities
offering high after-tax returns. Moreover, a sim-
pler, more efficient tax system could be ex-
pected to increase taxpayer compliance and
reduce administrative costs.3
In economics, a benchmark for the study of
tax policy is the approach pioneered by Ramsey
(1927). He considered the problem faced by a
benevolent government policymaker who is
asked to choose a set of welfare-maximizing tax
rates in order to finance some level of public
expenditures.4  In our paper, we adopt such an
approach, but introduce another dimension to
the problem. That is, we study the welfare im-
plications of two features of the tax code high-
lighted by ERTA81 and TRA86: 1) the degree to
which depreciation expenses are tax deductible,
and 2) the differential tax treatment of labor and
capital incomes. We formulate the government’s
problem as one in which the policymaker se-
lects an optimal program of taxes, borrowing,
and public expenditures to maximize the dis-
counted utility of an infinitely lived representa-
tive household. In comparison to the standard
Ramsey problem, we introduce one new para-
meter and one additional constraint that govern
the structural features of the tax code. The para-
meter controls the degree to which depreciation
expenses are tax deductible. The constraint con-
trols whether labor and capital income may be
taxed differently. We solve the government’s
problem over a range of structural combinations
and compute the resulting long-run allocations.
The inputs to the model’s production tech-
nology are per capita quantities of labor, pri-
vate capital, and public capital. This setup is
motivated by an expanding body of recent the-
oretical and empirical research which suggests
that public capital may play an important role
in the dynamics of economic growth.5  Our
specification of constant returns to scale across
all three inputs implies that competitive firms
realize positive economic profits equal to the
difference between the value of output and the
payments made to the private inputs. Ideally,
the government would like to tax these profits
at a rate of 100 percent, because profits do not
affect agents’ decisions at the margin. However,
if (as we assume) the government cannot dis-
tinguish between profits and other types of
capital income, then the capital tax also func-
tions as a tax on profits, but one with an en-
dogenous upper bound.
We find that in such an environment, long-
run household welfare (as measured by steady-
state utility) can be improved by a policy of
“accelerated depreciation,” whereby the depre-
ciation rate for tax purposes exceeds the rate of
economic depreciation. Accelerated deprecia-
tion, combined with a positive tax rate on all
capital income, serves to increase the effective
tax rate on pure profits relative to other types
T A B L E 1
Average Marginal Tax Rates 
before and after TRA86
Before TRA86 After TRA86
Labor income 41.6 38.0
Capital income 34.5 38.4
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, 1987, table 2-6, p. 91.
n 2 2 Under TRA86, the 15 percent tax bracket and the personal exemp-
tion were phased out, creating an implicit third bracket for high-income
individuals at 33 percent. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
(OBRA90) created a new statutory bracket at 31 percent. OBRA93, enacted
in August 1993, created two additional statutory brackets for high-income
individuals, making a total of five: 15, 28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent. See
Economic Report of the President, 1994, table 1-4, p. 34.
n 3 3 For additional description and analysis of TRA86, see Slemrod
(1991) and the two symposia in Journal of Economic Perspectives,sum-
mer 1987 and winter 1992.
n 4 4 Examples of this approach in the context of dynamic general equi-
librium models include Kydland and Prescott (1980), Lucas and Stokey
(1983), Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Lucas (1990), Zhu (1992, 1995),
Bull (1993), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994, 1995), Roubini and
Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Coleman (1996), and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
(1993, 1997).
n 5 5 The idea that public capital may represent an important productive
input is not new (see Arrow and Kurz [1970]). Some recent papers that
explore the theoretical implications of productive public expenditures
include Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Baxter and King
(1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), Judd
(1997b), Lansing (1997), and Cassou and Lansing (1997). Some recent
empirical applications include Finn (1993), Ai and Cassou (1995), and
Kocherlakota and Yi (1996, 1997). See Sturm, Kuper, and de Haan (1997)
for an extensive review of the empirical evidence regarding the productive
effects of public capital.
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of capital income. In this way, accelerated de-
preciation helps undo the restriction that pre-
vents the government from imposing a separate
tax on profits.
We also examine the effects of imposing
separate tax rates on labor and capital income
versus applying a uniform tax rate to all income.
This portion of our analysis is motivated not
only by TRA86 (which partially closed the gap
between labor and capital tax rates), but also
by recently proposed versions of the so-called
“flat tax,” which calls for a uniform tax rate on
all taxable income.6  Since tax rates in our
model are endogenous, the government ad-
justs both the labor tax and the capital tax in
response to any change in the depreciation al-
lowance. The use of a uniform income tax im-
poses an additional constraint on the govern-
ment’s decision problem, namely, that the tax
rate on labor income must equal the tax rate on
capital income. If the additional constraint is
binding, household welfare will be lower rela-
tive to the unconstrained case. 
In the calibrated version of our model, how-
ever, we find that the optimal steady-state tax
rates on labor and capital income are numeri-
cally close for a range of typical depreciation
tax policies. Thus, the additional constraint
under the uniform income tax is not severely
binding in the steady state. This means that the
benefits from separate tax rates on labor and
capital income tend to be small.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section I describes the model. The
computation procedure and choice of parame-
ter values are discussed in section II. Section III
presents our quantitative results, and section IV
concludes. An appendix provides technical
details regarding the solution of the govern-
ment’s problem.
I. The Model
The model economy consists of a private sector
that operates in competitive markets and a
benevolent optimizing government. The private
sector is typical of macroeconomic models with
agents behaving optimally, taking government
policy as a given. In formulating its policy, the
government takes into account the rational
responses of the private sector. Below, we de-
scribe each of these features in more detail.
The Private Sector
The private sector consists of a large but fixed
number of identical households, each of which
owns a single firm that produces output yt ac-
cording to the technology




where u1+ u2 + u3 = 1.7 This technology is
characterized by three factors of production:
the per capita stock of private capital kt, per
capita labor hours ht, and the per capita stock
of public capital kgt. Here, kgt is specified as a
per capita quantity so that no scale effects are
associated with the number of firms.8  We as-
sume that firms operate in competitive markets
and maximize profits. The firm’s decision prob-
lem can be summarized as 
(2)     max (kt
u1ht
u2kgt
u3 – rtkt – wtht ),
kt, ht
where rt is the rental rate on private capital and
wt is the real wage. Since u1 + u2 + u3 = 1, the
firm earns an economic profit equal to the dif-
ference between the value of output and the
payments made to the private inputs. Our as-
sumptions about firm ownership imply that all
households receive equal amounts of total prof-
its. The market-clearing input prices and the
resulting firm profits are given by 
(3)     rt = u1yt /kt
(4)     wt = u2yt /ht
(5)     pt = (1 – u1 – u2)yt.
The infinitely lived representative household
maximizes a stream of discounted utilities: 
(6)     max
¥
t = 0 S bt(lnct – Aht + Blngt), A, B . 0,
n 6 6 For details regarding the flat tax, see Hall and Rabushka (1995).
For a theoretical analysis of the growth effects of a flat tax, see Cassou and
Lansing (1996).
n 7 7 Empirical work by Aschauer (1989), Munnell (1990), andAi and
Cassou (1995) supports a technology specification with u1+ u2 + u3 = 1.
n 8 8 This setup can be viewed as incorporating an implicit congestion
effect related to the number of firms (which is equal to the number of house-
holds here). See Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Judd (1997b) for mod-
els in which an explicit congestion effect is linked to levels of the private-
sector inputs kt and ht.
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where b [ (0,1) is the household discount fac-
tor, ct is private consumption, and ht  is hours
worked. The fact that utility is linear in hours
worked draws on the formulation of indivisible
labor described by Rogerson (1988) and Hansen
(1985). This implies that all fluctuations in total
labor hours are due to the number of workers
employed, rather than to variations in hours
per worker.9  Household preferences also in-
clude a term representing the utility provided by
per capita public consumption goods gt. The
specification of additive separability in gt is sup-
ported by parameter estimates in McGrattan,
Rogerson, and Wright (1997) using postwar
U.S. data. This setup simplifies the computa-
tions, because the term involving gt can be
ignored when deriving the household opti-
mization conditions.
The household faces the following within-
period budget constraint: 
(7)     ct + xt + bt + 1 # (1 – tht)wtht
+ (1 – tkt)(rtkt + pt + rbtb t)
+ tktfdkt + bt,
with k0 and b0 given. Here, xt is private invest-
ment and bt represents one-period, real gov-
ernment bonds that earn interest at rate rbt. We
assume that the government levies taxes on
two categories of income. Labor income, given
by wtht, is taxed at rate tht. Capital income,
given by rtkt + pt + rbtb t, is taxed at rate tkt.10
Households view tkt, tht, wt, rt, rbt, and pt as
determined outside their control.
A few words about the model’s assumed tax
structure are in order. Here, as is typically the
case in Ramsey problems, the government’s
menu of available tax instruments is artificially
restricted, first by ruling out lump-sum taxes,
second by ruling out consumption taxes, and
third by ruling out a separate tax on profits.
Since profits do not affect household decisions
at the margin, the government would want to
tax profits as much as possible to obtain non-
distortionary revenue. If a separate tax on prof-
its were available, the government would set
the tax rate equal to 100 percent, and the model
would behave in much the same way as one
having no profits to begin with. In particular,
the optimal steady-state tax on capital income
would equal zero.
For our purposes, this is not a desirable re-
sult because we are interested in formulating a
model that can capture some important ob-
served features of U.S. tax policy. So that our
model may capture positive capital taxation, we
postulate that the government cannot distin-
guish between profits and other types of capital
income. In such an environment, the capital tax
also serves as a tax on pure profits, but one
with an endogenous upper bound.11
The term tktfdkt represents a depreciation
allowance, where d [ [0,1] is the capital depre-
ciation rate, and f $ 0 is a tax-structure para-
meter that controls the degree to which de-
preciation expenses are tax deductible. The
effective depreciation rate for tax purposes can
be viewed as fd. When f > 1, the effective
depreciation rate exceeds the rate of economic
depreciation d. We refer to this case as a policy
of “accelerated” depreciation. In reality, accel-
erated depreciation implies f > 1 in the early
years of an asset’s life, but f < 1 in later years.
In our model, however, f can be interpreted as
a weighted-average value over the asset’s entire
life. The law of motion for the private capital
stock is 
(8)     kt  + 1 = (1 – d)kt + xt.
The household first-order conditions with
respect to the indicated variables and the asso-
ciated transversality conditions (TVC) are 
(9a) ct : lt = 1/ct
(9b) ht : lt(1 – tht)wt = A
(9c) kt + 1: lt = blt + 1[(1 – tkt + 1)rt +1
– (1 – ftkt + 1)d + 1]
(9d) bt + 1: lt = blt + 1
[(1 – tkt + 1)rbt + 1 + 1]
(9e) TVC: limbtltkt + 1 = 0
t ® ¥
(9f) TVC: limbtltbt + 1 = 0,
t ® ¥
n 9 9 In post–World War II U.S. data, about two-thirds of the variance in
total labor hours over the business cycle is due to changes in the number
of workers. See Kydland and Prescott (1990).
n 1 10 0 An alternative decentralization, which is equivalent to the one
used here, combines the household and firm problems such that after-
tax capital income is (1 – tkt) (yt – wtht + rbtbt), where yt is given by
equation (1).
n 1 11 1 The zero-tax result is discussed by Arrow and Kurz (1970), pp.
195–203, and has been further elaborated on by Judd (1985), Chamley
(1986), and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993, 1997). Besides profits, other
mechanisms for overturning the zero-tax result include borrowing con-
straints, monopoly power, externalities, alternative specifications of the cap-
ital accumulation technology, and untaxed factors of production. For de-
tails, see Aiyagari (1995), Judd (1997a, 1997b), Zhu (1995), Guo and
Lansing (1995), and Correia (1996).
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where lt is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the budget constraint (7). The transversality
conditions ensure that (7) can be transformed
into an infinite-horizon, present-value budget
constraint.
The Government
The government chooses a program of taxes,
borrowing, and public expenditures to maxi-
mize the representative household’s discounted
utility. To avoid time-inconsistency problems,
we assume that the government can commit to
a sequence of policies announced at t = 0. Fol-
lowing the approach of Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe (1994, 1995), we further assume that  tk0
and rb0 are specified exogenously such that tax
revenue collected at t = 0 cannot finance all
future expenditures. Otherwise, an initial levy
on private-sector assets may allow the govern-
ment to choose tht = tkt = 0 for some t > t
^. This
case is not very interesting because after period
t
^, the model looks identical to one with lump-
sum taxes.
In per capita terms, the government’s budget
constraint is 
(10)     gt + xgt + bt (1 + rbt) – bt + 1
= thtwtht + tkt [(rt – fd)kt + pt + rbtbt].
Government expenditures on the left side of
(10) include public consumption gt, public in-
vestment xgt , and outlays associated with gov-
ernment borrowing. The law of motion for the
stock of public capital is 
(11)   kgt + 1 = (1 – dg)kgt  +  xgt ,
with kg0 given. The depreciation rate of public
capital is dg. The summation of the household
budget constraint (7) and the government bud-
get constraint (10) yields the following per
capita resource constraint for the economy: 
(12)   yt = ct + gt + xt + xgt.
Since the resource constraint and the govern-
ment budget constraint are not independent
equations, (12) will be used in place of (10) in
formulating the government’s problem.
As a condition for equilibrium, government
policy must consider the rational responses of
the private sector, as summarized by (3)–(5),
(7), and (9a)–(9e). It is convenient to use
these constraints to eliminate some variables,
so that the government’s problem is formu-
lated as one in which the policymaker directly
chooses a sequence of optimal allocations 
{ct, ht, gt, kt +1, kgt +1}¥
t = 0. Once known, this se-
quence can be used to recover a sequence of
optimal tax rates and government debt that will
support the allocations as a decentralized equi-
librium. The appendix provides technical de-
tails concerning the formulation and solution 
of the government’s decision problem.
Up to this point, our model has allowed for
differential tax treatment of labor and capital
income. However, as noted in the introduction,
an important consequence of TRA86 was that
average marginal tax rates on these two sources
of income were brought closer together. We
investigate the welfare implications of this sort
of tax structure by further restricting the menu
of available tax instruments such that tht = tkt =
tt for all t. In this case, equations (3), (4), and
(9a)–(9c) are used to derive the following
additional constraint on the government’s
choice of allocations:
(13)
Ahtct –  3
ct/(bct – 1) – 1 + d(1 – f)4 = 0.
u2yt u1yt /kt – fd
At t =0, the above constraint takes the form
u2y 0
– (1 – tk0) = 0,where tk0 is given.
II. Computation 
and Calibration
Because our focus is on the long-run stationary
equilibrium, we use the steady-state level of the
household’s within-period utility function as our
basic welfare measure. The change in steady-
state utility from one tax structure to another
can be readily translated into an annual cost
and expressed as a percentage of total output.
This welfare measure provides a rough estimate
of the available gains or losses that might be
realized by changing the tax code according to
the options we consider. To gauge the magni-
tude of these welfare effects, we compare them
to the available gains from switching to a sys-
tem of nondistortionary lump-sum taxes.
A more comprehensive welfare analysis
would need to take into account the dynamic
transition between steady states. However, dur-
ing the initial phase of the transition, the gov-
ernment in our model has a strong incentive 
to impose tkt = 1, since the beginning stock of
household assets (k0 and b0) is fixed. Indeed,
Coleman (1996) shows that the welfare gain
from this initial period of heavy capital taxation
tends to dominate any differences between final
steady states. Although this scenario provides
Ah0c 0
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doubtful that confiscatory taxes of this kind are
politically feasible.
An alternative approach to transitions as-
sumes that shifts in tax rates between steady
states are given by some exogenously specified
pattern. Using this approach, Lucas (1990),
Cooley and Hansen (1992), and Laitner (1995)
find that transitions involve a welfare loss that
reduces the available gains from moving to a
more desirable steady state. Coleman (1996)
shows that these kinds of welfare calculations
are strongly influenced by the starting tax-rate
levels and the pattern of taxes allowed during
the transition.
Given the many ways in which transitions
can be modeled, we have chosen to compare
tax structures on the basis of steady-state wel-
fare analysis. Our results should thus be quali-
fied to the extent that transitions between
steady states produce significant benefits or
costs. Our computation procedure holds the
steady-state level of debt, b, constant across  
tax structures. Additional details are contained
in the appendix.
To perform the quantitative welfare analysis,
we must first assign values to the model para-
meters. In doing so, we adopt a baseline tax
structure defined as one where the depreciation
rate for tax purposes coincides with the rate of
economic depreciation (f = 1.0), and where
labor and capital incomes are taxed separately
(tht Þ tkt). Parameters are then assigned values
based on empirically observed features of the
postwar U.S. economy.12  The time period in the
model is taken to be one year, consistent with
the frequency of most government fiscal deci-
sions. The discount factor b = 0.962 is chosen to
yield a real after-tax interest rate of 4 percent.
The parameter A in the household utility
function is chosen such that the fraction of time
spent working is equal to 0.3 in the steady state.
This is consistent with time-use studies, which
indicate that households spend approximately
one-third of their discretionary time in market
work (see, for example, Juster and Stafford
[1991]). The value of B is chosen to yield a
steady-state ratio g /y = 0.17, the average value
for the U.S. economy from 1954 to 1992.13
The exponents u1 and u3 in the Cobb–
Douglas production function are chosen such
that the model’s steady-state capital-to-output
ratios, k /y and kg/y, coincide with the post-
war U.S. averages of 2.61 and 0.61, respect-
ively. The exponent u2 is then given by u2 = 
1 – u1 – u3. The resulting values of u1 and u2
are within the range of the estimated shares of
GNP received by private capital and labor in
the U.S. economy.14  The depreciation rates d
and dg are chosen such that the model’s steady-
state investment-to-output ratios, x/y and 
xg/y, coincide with the postwar U.S. averages
of 0.22 and 0.03. The steady-state level of gov-
ernment debt, b, is held constant at a value of
0.190 for each tax structure. For the baseline
tax structure, this level of debt implies a steady-
state ratio of  b/y = 0.37, which matches the
average level of U.S. federal debt held by the
public as a fraction of GNP from 1954 to 1992.
Table 2 summarizes the parameter values used
in the computations.
16













n 1 12 2 The sample period begins in 1954. Data sources are as follows:
The capital and investment series are in 1987 dollars from U.S. Department
of Commerce, Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States,
1993. The series for kgt and xgt include nonmilitary government-owned
equipment, structures, and residential components. The series for kt and
xt include business equipment and structures, consumer durables, and
residential components. The “capital input” version of the net stock series
(which measures the remaining productive services available) was used 
for all capital data. Annualized series for the following variables were con-
structed using the indicated quarterly series from Citibase: yt = GNPQ, 
and gt = GGEQ – xgt – military investment. The series for bt /yt is federal
debt held by the public as a fraction of GNP, where the debt series is from
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Federal Debt and Interest Costs, 1993,
table A-2.
n 1 13 3 In computing this average, public consumption was estimated by
subtracting total public investment (including military investment) from the
annualized series for government purchases of goods and services, GGEQ.
This was done to reduce double counting, since the GGEQ series does not
distinguish between consumption and investment goods.
n 1 14 4 See Christiano (1988). The range of direct empirical estimates
for u3 at the aggregate national level is quite large. Aschauer (1989) and
Munnell (1990) estimate values of 0.39 and 0.34, respectively. Finn (1993)
estimates a value of 0.16 for highway public capital. Aaron (1990) and
Tatom (1991) argue that removing the effects of trends and taking account
of possible missing explanatory variables (such as oil prices) can yield
point estimates for u3 that are not statistically different from zero.
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III. Quantitative
Results
Figures 1 and 2 plot the depreciation allowance
parameter f versus the corresponding changes
in steady-state welfare and output, relative to
the baseline tax structure (f = 1.0 and tht Þ tkt).
Figures 3 and 4 show the effects of f on the
optimal steady-state tax rates and the optimal
ratio of government expenditures to output.
Tables 3 and 4 provide the quantitative results
for two particular cases: f = 1.0 and f = 1.2. 
In all cases, the model parameters are held
constant at the values shown in table 2.
Two general observations about the effects
of changes in tax structure can be made. First,
steady-state welfare and output are both in-
creasing in f. Second, the welfare and output
effects of switching to a uniform income tax are
extremely small when in the vicinity of f= 1.0, a
typical value in models of dynamic fiscal policy.
The intuition for these results is straightfor-
ward. Recall that the government prefers to tax
profits at a rate of 100 percent, because profits
do not distort household decisions at the mar-
gin. A higher value of f, combined with a posi-
tive tax rate on all capital income, serves to
increase the effective tax rate on profits relative
to other types of capital income. In this way, a
policy of accelerated depreciation helps to un-
do the restriction that prevents the government
from imposing a separate tax on profits. Figure
3 shows that as f increases, the optimal steady-
state tax on capital income, tk, also rises. At
higher values of f, the capital tax takes on
more of the character of a profits tax. The in-
crease in tk allows for a lower distortionary tax
on labor income th  and, as shown in figure 4, 
F I G U R E 1
F I G U R E 3
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a higher ratio of government expenditures to
output (g + xg)/y. Quantitatively, however, the
effect of f on the government expenditure ratio
is very small.
When tax rates on labor and capital income
are chosen separately, the values of  th and  tk
turn out to be numerically very close when in
the neighborhood of f = 1.0 (see figure 3 and
table 4). As a result, the Lagrange multiplier mt
associated with (13) is near zero in the steady
state, and the constraint has only a minor im-
pact on long-run allocations. Notice that in
some instances, the steady-state utility under a
uniform income tax can actually be higher than
in the unconstrained case (figure 1). This is be-
cause the government’s objective is to maxi-
mize a discounted stream of within-period util-
ity functions, as opposed to maximizing a
steady-state utility expression. Note also that the
value of the uniform income tax rate t is al-
ways between the values of th and tk (figure 3).
Table 3 shows that a policy of accelerated
depreciation, with f = 1.2, will increase steady-
state welfare by almost 0.5 percent relative to
the baseline case. To help gauge the magnitude
of this effect, we can compare it to the available
gain from switching to a system of nondistor-
tionary lump-sum taxes. We find that the latter is
10.85 percent.15  Thus, the welfare effects asso-
ciated with changing from one distortionary tax
structure to another are much smaller than the
effects associated with eliminating distortions
altogether. As another comparison, the welfare
effects in table 3 are of the same order of mag-
nitude as the steady-state welfare cost resulting
from a 5 percent annual inflation rate as com-
puted by Cooley and Hansen (1991, table 1),
who obtain a value of 0.63 percent of output.
IV. Conclusion
We have examined the welfare implications of
some basic structural features of the U.S. tax
code, specifically, the tax deductibility of depre-
ciation and the practice of taxing labor income
differently from capital income. Our principal
finding is that a policy of accelerated deprecia-
tion can help mimic the features of a profits tax
and thereby improve welfare. We also find that
the long-run welfare consequences of separate
tax rates on labor and capital income tend to be
small in the range of typical depreciation tax
policies. Although our model is admittedly an
abstract and simplified representation of the
vastly complex U.S. tax code, we believe it may
offer a possible justification for some observed
features of recent tax reforms.
n 1 15 5 As in table 3, the change in steady-state utility DU is converted
into consumption units and expressed as a percentage of steady-state
output relative to the baseline tax structure.
T A B L E 3
Welfare and Output Comparison 
for Selected Cases (percent)
f = 1.0








tht Þ tkt tht = tkt = tt
Steady-state
welfare change 0.446 0.470
Steady-state
output change 1.449 1.172
a. Baseline.
NOTE: The steady-state welfare change is defined as 100DU/(ly ), where
DU is the change in steady-state utility relative to the baseline tax structure 
(f = 1.0 and tht Þ tkt ), where l and y are maintained at the values asso-
ciated with the baseline tax structure. We divide by the Lagrange multiplier 
l in order to convert DU into units of consumption goods. The steady-state
output change is defined as 100Dy/y , where  y is again maintained at the
value associated with the baseline tax structure.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E 4
Tax-Rate Comparison 
for Selected Cases (percent)
f = 1.0
tht Þ tkt tht = tkt = tt
Steady-state th = 28.3
tax rates tk = 25.0
t = 27.5
f = 1.2
tht Þ tkt tht = tkt = tt
Steady-state th = 27.2
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ct /(bct –1) – 1 + d (1 – f)4 (1 – u1 – u2)yt6 +
19
Formulation of the 
Government’s Problem
As noted in the text, the government must take into account the rational responses of the private
sector, as summarized by equations (3)–(5), (7), and (9a)–(9e). These equations can be conve-
niently summarized by the following “implementability constraint”: 
A P P E N D I X
Formulation and Solution 




Equation (A1) is obtained by substituting the first-order conditions of the household and firm in-
to the present-value household budget constraint. More specifically, it is obtained as follows: Multiply
both sides of the household budget constraint (7) by 1/ct, substitute in (3)–(5) and (9a)–(9d),
iterate the resulting expression forward and sum over time, and then apply the transversality condi-
tions (9e) and (9f).
Government policy must also satisfy the condition tk t # l, so that households have an incentive
to rent their capital stock to firms instead of simply letting it depreciate and writing off the deprecia-
tion against their tax bill. Using (9a) and (9c), this condition can be written as 
which is imposed as an additional constraint on the government’s problem. 
Since tk0 and rb0 are specified exogenously, the government’s problem amounts to choosing a
set of allocations {ct, ht, gt, kt +1, kgt+1}t
¥
=0 to maximize household utility (6) subject to the imple-
mentability constraint (A1), the resource constraint (12), and the tax-rate constraint (A2). Given the
optimal allocations, both the appropriate sequence of factor prices rt and wt and the policy vari-
ables tht, tkt, rbt, and bt +1 that decentralize the allocations can be recovered from the private-sector
equilibrium conditions. For example, the optimal allocations define wt and lt from equations (4)
and (9a). Given wt and lt, equation (9b) defines the government’s optimal choice for tht.
The general version of the government’s problem can be written as 
Sbt
¥
t = 1 u1yt /kt – fd
1
1
S bt 5lnct – Aht + Blngt +
¥
t = 1
L31 – Aht –  ct 3
ct /(bct –1) – 1 + d (1 – f)
4 (1 – u1 – u2)yt4 6 +
u1yt /kt – fd
1
1 – Ah0  – c 0
(1 – tk0)(1 – u1 – u2)y 0 – c 0
(Rk 0k 0 + Rb 0b0) = 0,  1
1 L 31 – Ah0 – c 0
(1 – tk0)(1 – u1 – u2)y 0 – c 0
(Rk 0k 0 + Rb 0b0)4,  1
where
Rk 0 = (1 – tk 0)u1y 0/k0 – (1 – ftk 0)d + 1
Rb0 = (1 – tk0)rb0 + 1.
(A2)   
1
–    
b 




lnc0 – Ah0 + Blng0 +
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with k0, kg0, b0, tk0, and rb0 given. The Lagrange multiplier L associated with (A1) is determined
endogenously at t = 0 and is constant over time.
In general, the tax-rate constraint (A2) will bind for a finite number of periods 0,1,2... t, and then
become slack for t > t . For t > t , the solution to (A3) can be characterized by a set of stationary
decision rules: ct (st, L), ht (st, L), gt(st, L), kt + 1(st, L), kgt + 1(st, L), where st = {kt, kgt, ct –1}.16 Given
these rules, a stationary decision rule for the government bond allocation bt + 1(st, L) can be com-
puted as the solution to the following recursive equation: 
ct (kt + 1 + bt + 1) = b 5ct +1 (kt + 2 + bt + 2) + 
1 – Aht + 1 – ct + 13
ct +1 /(bct) + d (1 – f)4 (1 – u1 – u2)yt + 16.
The Optimal Steady-State
Capital Tax
The government’s first-order condition with respect to kt +1 is 
Equation (A4) is the household budget constraint at t + 1 after substituting in the first-order con-
ditions for the private sector. For t # t, the optimal allocations are determined using the govern-
ment’s first-order conditions with respect to ct, ht, gt, kt +1, kgt +1 and ht, where ht is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (A2). The computation works backward in time starting from t = t, and
imposes the stationary decision rules for t > t as boundary conditions. The entire sequence of allo-
cations, together with the initial conditions, determines L such that the implementability constraint
(A1) is satisfied. Notice that when L = ht = 0, the government’s problem (A3) collapses to a social
planner’s problem. The planner’s allocations can be decentralized when the government has access
to lump-sum taxes.
Rk 0 = (1 – tk 0)u1y 0/k0 – (1 – ftk0)d + 1
Rb0 = (1 – tk 0)rb0 + 1








1      b
ct
– ct + 1
[1 – d(1 – f)]  $ 0
Ahtct –3
ct /(bct –1) – 1 + d (1 – f)4 = 0, when tht = tkt = tt,  u1yt /kt – fd





– B +  bB
gt gt +1 [u1yt + 1/kt +1 + 1 – d]  +  bL  ¶kt + 1  +  bmt + 1 ¶kt + 1 = 0,
¶Wt + 1 ¶Ft + 1 (A5)
n 1 16 6 Including ct – 1 in the state vector at time t is the mechanism by
which the commitment assumption is maintained in the recursive version
of (A3). See Kydland and Prescott (1980).
where mt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (13). If labor and capital incomes can be taxed
separately, then mt = 0 for all t. To conserve space,Wt and Ft are defined as follows:
subject to
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The optimal long-run allocations in the model depend on the Lagrange multiplier L, which is com-
puted as follows. First, we use the constraints in (A3) to substitute out gt and yt. The tax-rate con-
straint (A2) can be ignored in this computation because it can later be verified that tk # 1, where tk
is the optimal steady-state tax on capital income. Next, we obtain the first-order conditions of (A3)
with respect to ct, ht, kt +1, kgt +1, and for the uniform income tax structure mt, where mt is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with (13). If labor and capital income can be taxed separately, then 
mt = 0 for all t.
Given an initial guess for L, we compute the steady state from the first-order conditions. We then
use the steady-state version of (A4) to compute the steady-state level of government debt b. We 
repeat this procedure, adjusting L for each tax structure so that all tax structures have the same level 
of steady-state debt. Our computation procedure implies a set of initial conditions {k 0, kg0, b0, tk0, rb0}
and allocations {ct, ht, gt, kt +1, kgt +1, ht, mt}t =0
t for each tax structure such that the implementa-
bility constraint (A1) is satisfied for the values of b and L that we obtain.18
With lump-sum taxes, the steady state is obtained from the first-order conditions of (A3) with
respect to ct, ht, kt + 1, and kgt + 1, with L = mt = 0 for all t.
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The steady-state version of (A5) can be written as
(A9) r – d – r = 0,
where r = u1y /k. The steady-state version of (9c) is 
where r = 1/b – 1 and Wk and Fk represent the steady-state values of the derivatives           and         ,
respectively. If profits are zero, then 1 – u1 – u2 = 0, and (A6) implies Wk = 0. If labor and capital in-
come can be taxed separately, then m = 0. If both of these conditions hold, then (A8) simplifies to 
(A10) (1 – tk)r – (1 – ftk)d – r = 0.
n 1 17 7 See Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) for a general proof of
this result.
n 1 18 8 Alternatively, we could assume that there exists a uniform set of
initial conditions for all tax structures, but allow for a lump-sum tax at t = 0
to satisfy the implementability constraint. See Chari, Christiano, and








[u1y/k – d – r] + L W k + mFk = 0, (A8)
u2yt u1yt/kt – fd
Ft º  Ahtct –3
ct /(bc
t – 1) – 1 + d (1 – f)4. (A7)
Wt º  ct 3
ct /(bct – 1) – 1 + d (1 – f)4 (1 – u1 – u2)yt u1yt /kt – fd
1 (A6)
Equation (A10) can be rearranged to obtain tk =
r – d – r. Combining this expression with (A9) yields
tk = 0, which confirms the result obtained by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). When 1 – u1 – u2 >  0
or m > 0, however, (A8) and (A10) imply tk > 0.17
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